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Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,I which was brought by several
states to challenge the insurance industry's right to McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunity, arguably represents the most important case ever under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 2 The case reached the United States Supreme Court
for the first time on appeal from the circuit court's decision to reinstate the
states' complaint, and on June 28, 1993, the Supreme Court resolved three
issues that affect the entire insurance industry enormously. The Supreme Court
held, first, that domestic insurance companies do not automatically forfeit their
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity by acting together with foreign
reinsurers to obtain industrywide changes to standard insurance policy forms.3
The Supreme Court nonetheless refused to reinstate the district court's
dismissal order on the basis of its second holding, that the complaint
sufficiently alleges a "boycott" which would forfeit the insurers' McCarran-
Ferguson Act immunity.4 A five-justice majority concluded, third, that
principles of international comity do not preclude U.S. courts from exercising
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction over the British reinsurers.
The Supreme Court's resolution to the "boycott" issue strikes the
appropriate delicate balance with respect to the scope of McCarran-Ferguson
1 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
The lower courts consolidated complaints filed by nineteen states and several private
plaintiffs into In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F.
Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd inpart, rev'd in
part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). The Supreme
Court, upon granting certiorari, treated Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California as
representative of one line of complaints and Merret Undenvriting Agency Management
Lintited v. California as representative of a separate and distinct second line of complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated these two complaints under the case name Hanford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California.
2 Professor Geoffrey P. Miller, a commercial law scholar at the University of
Chicago Law School, asserts that the cases are, in fact, the most important cases ever.
See Marcia Coyle, Down to Business, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1993, at 1.
3 Hanford, 113 S. Ct. at 2903.
4yId. at 2917.
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immunity by simultaneously demanding insurance industry accountability while
ensuring the widespread availability of insurance. By finding sufficient
allegations of a boycott, the Supreme Court has given the states' attorneys
general the green light to proceed with the suit and consequently sent a signal
to the insurance industry that it does not have blanket immunity under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act from Sherman Act antitrust liability. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court defined boycott narrowly enough to maintain for the
insurance industry a "safe harbor" where the industry can pursue efforts
toward standardization of insurance policy forms to the extent these efforts
benefit consumers.
The Supreme Court majority's ruling on extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act, on the other hand, missed the mark. By defining "true conflict"
narrowly enough to support a finding that no true conflict exists under the facts
in Hartford, a five-justice majority reversed inroads made over almost twenty
years by U.S. jurisprudence toward establishing the notion of international
comity as an integral factor in the extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis. As
evidenced by the British government's persistent assertions against
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws and as emphasized in a dissent
authored by Justice Scalia, the majority's holding impedes diplomatic
relationships with foreign countries. Significantly, the ruling has this
detrimental diplomatic effect without providing any benefits to U.S. consumers
beyond the protections that are inherent in the Supreme Court's rulings on the
boycott issue. The British reinsurers maintain a presence in the U.S. insurance
market exclusively through their contractual dealings with U.S. primary
insurers. Any restrictions placed by the Supreme Court on domestic primary
insurers' conduct necessarily proscribes by extension, therefore, the conduct of
the British reinsurers, even if the British reinsurers never appear in U.S.
courts. The Supreme Court's rulings on the boycott issue were therefore
sufficient to ensure that U.S. antitrust laws achieve their intended benefit of
protecting U.S. consumers without the Supreme Court's extraterritoriality
ruling.
The dissent would have achieved a better result. As recognized by the
dissent, a proper extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis into the scope of the
Sherman Act takes into account principles of international comity, and those
principles are violated by an assertion of jurisdiction over the British
reinsurers. As the dissent warns, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws "will bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary
conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries-particularly our closest
trading partners."5
5 Id. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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II. CASE HISTORY
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit found that the international
comity factor weighed against the assertion of extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction.6 Solely the Supreme Court held that this consideration did not
weigh against assertion of jurisdiction. In 1984, Insurance Services Office, Inc.
(ISO)7 proposed two new standard insurance forms to the state departments of
insurance as replacements for its 1973 form.8 After the changeover, nineteen
states accused several insurers and several reinsurers, including Lloyds of
London, of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 The states alleged that the
agreement between the primary insurers and the reinsurers that resulted in the
modified policy forms constituted a boycott.10
The district court dismissed the suit based on its finding that the challenged
activity fell within the scope of McCarran-Ferguson immunity from antitrust
liability. 11 The British reinsurers had moved for dismissal, however, not only
on the basis of the McCarran-Ferguson Act but also for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or on the basis of international comity. 12 The British reinsurers
based this motion on the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
(FTAIA)13 and on the doctrine of international comity as stated in imberlane
6 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
7 The result of a 1971 merger of eleven insurance rating bureaus and currently
licensed in all fifty states, ISO is a licensed association of over fourteen hundred insurance
companies that develops standardized policy forms, collects statistical data, estimates risks
relevant to the standard policy forms and, where required, presents the forms to state
regulators for approval. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468-69
(N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
8 In re Insurance Antitust Litig., 938 F.2d at 924. The proposed forms allegedly
substantially modified coverage. Once the states approved the new forms, ISO withdrew its
data collection and statistical risk-analysis support for the replaced form. Id. Without the
statistical support, insurers cannot effectively assess the risks associated with a given
insurance policy.
9 In re Insurance AntitrustLitig., 723 F. Supp. at 468.
10 Id.
111Id. at 491.
12 Id. at 484.
13 Act of Oct. 8, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 1246. The
FTAIA removes from the scope of the Sherman Act "'conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations...' unless that conduct
has a 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' on commerce within the United
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.14 As a result of a three-step analysis, the
district court agreed with the British reinsurers and declined to exercise
jurisdiction.1 5 The district court concluded that the London reinsurance
business "takes place in a regulatory and competitive framework established by
the British government" and that "the evidence of conflict between [U.S.]
antitrust laws and English law and policy is substantial" so that the conflict
with British law and policy which would result from the extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws outweighed the remaining Timberlane
factors. 16
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.17 On the issue of
extraterritorial jurisdiction specifically, the Ninth Circuit expressly applied the
Yimberlane analysis, acknowledging its "wide following."' 8 The Ninth Circuit
nonetheless concluded that the comity analysis of Timberlane indicated that
subject matter jurisdiction over the British reinsurers "must" be exercised. 19
States, import trade into the United States, or export trade engaged in by a person within the
United States. 15 U.S.C. Section 6a." In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 486.
14 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Timberlane I"), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453
(N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Timberlane II"), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1032 (1985).
15 The district court first held that the FTAIA did not apply. In re Insurance Antitrust
Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 486. The district court then applied the two-part Timberlane analysis.
First, the district court concluded that the allegations establishing a direct effect in the
United States were sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The district court
nonetheless declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the second part of the
Timberlane analysis, which allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in consideration
of international comity. Id. at 487.
16 Id. at 487-90.
17 In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). The
Ninth Circuit ruled that state regulation of the British reinsurers was insufficient to support
McCarran-Ferguson immunity for the British reinsurers and that the domestic insurers
forfeited their own McCarran-Ferguson immunity by conspiring with the nonexempt British
reinsurers. Id. at 928. The Ninth Circuit held that the insurers forfeited their McCarran-
Ferguson immunity for the second, independent, reason that the insurers' alleged conduct
constituted a "boycott." Id.
18 Id. at 932.
19 Id. at 934. According to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, the FTAIA affected the
Timberlane analysis without eliminating entirely the comity notion. Id. at 932. Applying the
analysis, the Ninth Circuit determined as follows:
A single factor points toward abstention: the conflict with a long-established British
policy toward a venerable British trade, the underwriting of insurance. Every other
factor-nationality, likelihood of compliance, the significance of the effects on
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On a different rationale, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
reinstatement of the complaint. 20 On the issue of extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction,21 Justice Souter wrote for the majority to reject the British
reinsurers' argument that the circumstances warranted restraint with respect to
the exercise of jurisdiction.22 Without deciding whether a court with Sherman
Act jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on the basis of
international comity,23 Justice Souter concluded that international comity did
not counsel against the exercise of jurisdiction because no true conflict exists
between domestic and foreign law.2 4 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Souter
rejected the argument that a conflict existed because the British reinsurers'
conduct was "perfectly consistent with" British law and policy.25 Justice Souter
rejected this proposed definition in favor of a narrower definition of true
conflict as the inability to comply with both domestic and foreign law.26
American commerce, their foreseeability and their purposefulness-points to the
appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction.
Id. at 934.
20 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2917 (1993). In one of two
separate opinions, Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous Court that the domestic primary
insurers did not forfeit their McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity from antitrust liability by
acting in concert with the foreign reinsurers. Id. at 2895, 2902. The Supreme Court
nonetheless reinstated the complaint on the justices' unanimous conclusion that most claims
fell within the McCarran-Ferguson boycott exception to immunity. Id. at 2917.
21 The Supreme Court had framed the question as follows: "Did the court of appeals
properly assess the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws in light of this Court's
teachings and contemporary understanding of international law when it held that a U.S.
district court may apply U.S. law to the conduct of a foreign insurance market regulated
abroad?" Id. at 2900 n.9.
The Supreme Court split five-to-four on this issue. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the majority opinion over a dissent written by
Justice Scalia and joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2895.22 Id. at 2911.
2 3 Id.
24 Id. at 2910. According to Justice Souter, even if the London reinsurers' conduct was
lawful under British law, "[n]o conflict exists... 'where a person subject to regulation by
two states can comply with the laws of both.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THID) OF
FOREiGN RELATIONS LAw § 403, cmt. e (1987)).
25 Id.
2 6 Id. at 2910.
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II. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's rulings come during an intense debate over the
continuing viability of McCarran-Ferguson immunity. The insurance industry
argues traditionally that standardizing insurance policy forms permits insurance
agents and customers to compare insurance policies and make informed choices
so that the benefits of industrywide cooperation outweigh any restraint on
trade. Consumer advocates, however, have become skeptical about alleged
consumer benefits from McCarran-Ferguson immunity and correspondingly
vocal about a need to limit-or to eliminate entirely-McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunity. 27 The Supreme Court responded to this debate with a decision that
partially favors each side. In a victory for the insurance industry, a five-justice
majority adopted a relatively narrow definition of what constitutes a boycott
sufficient to forfeit McCarran-Ferguson immunity.28 The majority's guidelines
consequently diminish the states' chances of an ultimate victory. In a victory
for the states' attorneys general on the other hand, the Supreme Court found,
notwithstanding the narrow definition of boycott, that the complaints'
allegations were in fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment and
therefore allowed the nineteen states to proceed with their antitrust suit against
the insurance industry. 29
The Supreme Court majority's ruling on the issue of extraterritorial
antitrust jurisdiction, however, benefits neither side of the debate significantly.
Congress enacted the Sherman Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act as
protections for U.S. consumers. 30 And the presence of British reinsurers in the
U.S. insurance market occurs entirely through their dealings with U.S.
27 See, e.g., Eddie Correia, Antitrust Policy After the Reagan Administration, 76
GEO. L.J. 329, 332 (1987).
28 Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2917.
29 Id.
30 H.R. REP. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1943). The Report notes:
Congress should not permit a broadening of the antitrust laws which will result in
rendering insurance open to the caprices of free competition, for it is a matter of
common knowledge to those who are informed that insurance is something quite
different from the ordinary commercial transaction.... Uniformity, as to rates, forms
of policies and the like, is not only desirable in insurance, but is necessary if the
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domestic insurers.31 To the extent the Supreme Court's guidelines restrict the
conduct of the U.S. domestic insurers for the benefit of U.S. consumers, the
guidelines necessarily restrict the conduct of the British reinsurers. The
Supreme Court's boycott guidelines therefore achieve the consumer protection
goal of U.S. antitrust laws-by permitting cooperative procedures that benefit
consumers-while reminding the insurance industry that not all cooperative
conduct will be protected from antitrust liability. Significantly, the boycott
guidelines achieve all of this whether or not the British reinsurers defend
themselves in U.S. courts. U.S. courts should therefore decline to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the British reinsurers, notwithstanding the U.S.
courts' subject matter jurisdiction, to the extent consumers accrue no benefit
from a British presence in U.S. courts, at least to the extent U.S. law permits
the courts some discretion in exercising jurisdiction. And U.S. jurisprudence
does in fact give the courts discretion over the exercise of jurisdiction.
The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations . "32 Although Congress
subsequently enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act to provide an exemption
from the Sherman Act,33 the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not derive from
31 In a reinsurance transaction, a reinsurer agrees contractually to assume part of the
risk of the primary insurer (the insurance company). See generally J. BUTLER & R.
MERaN, RuNmcE LAw § A.1.1 (1992).
32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
33 The McCarran-Ferguson Act states as follows:
(a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business.
(b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance ... ; Provided, That... the Sherman Act... shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988).
(b) Nothing contained in this Act... shall render the... Sherman
Act... inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
Id. § 1013.
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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
congressional concern over extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.34
The McCarran-Ferguson Act therefore does not provide per se protection to the
British reinsurers from having to defend themselves in U.S. courts, and the
Sherman Act applies to govern the conduct of the British reinsurers to the
extent its scope extends extraterritorially.
Supreme Court precedent defining the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act makes clear that the Sherman Act does in fact have extraterritorial
application so that U.S. courts do have jurisdiction over the British reinsurers
in the states' Sherman Act claims. The Supreme Court initially refused to apply
U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially. 35 The initial analysis was superseded,
however, in 1945 when the Second Circuit, acting for the Supreme Court in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), established an "effects" test
of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and sanctioned extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws if the foreign conduct was intended to and did have
consequences in the United States. 36
Alcoa and the principle of stare decisis would, without more, require U.S.
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the British reinsurers. The states allege that
the British reinsurers expressly intended to affect the U.S. insurance market
and that their conduct had substantially all "effects" in the United States. Alcoa
does not stand alone, however, to provide the sole analytical approach to
determining whether to assert antitrust jurisdiction extraterritorially.
Simultaneously with establishing the effects test in Alcoa, Judge Learned
Hand expressed his concern that the effects test, by including remote or
3 4 The McCarran-Ferguson exemption from antitrust liability represents congressional
recognition that standardizing insurance policy forms is a valid and important goal of state
regulation over the insurance industry and therefore offers an antitrust exemption for the
"business of insurance" to the extent it is "regulated by State law." See H.R. REP. No. 873,
78th Cong., lst Sess. 8 (1943).
35 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
36 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In Alcoa, the
U.S. government sued primarily to end Alcoa's domestic aluminum monopoly but also
contested business arrangement allegedly involving both Alcoa and foreign companies. The
federal court ultimately found that Alcoa had not participated in the international
agreements. Id. at 442. The federal court therefore was required to address whether the
Sherman Act reached an agreement between solely foreign companies that was negotiated
and entered into abroad. Id. at 443.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the exact facts in Alcoa, with solely foreign
violators whose acts occurred entirely outside the territorial United States. Alcoa is good
authority, however, insofar as the Second Circuit acted for the Supreme Court in Alcoa. See
id. at 421. The Supreme Court itself has noted that Alcoa "was decided under unique
circumstances which add to its weight as a precedent." American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
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speculative effects, threatened unlimited jurisdiction.37 Similar concerns have
led U.S. courts, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, and
Congress in the FTAIA to advocate approaches that consider not only Alcoa's
effects test but also the notion of international comity. These jurisprudential
developments at the very least complicate the seemingly easy conclusion that
Alcoa requires the Supreme Court to assert jurisdiction over the British
reinsurers in this instance. These developments at most should have compelled
the Supreme Court to recognize that a proper analysis into the exercise of
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act does not end with Alcoa but
instead requires a two-part analysis. A court must determine first whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction. That subject matter jurisdiction exists, however,
does not end the analysis. The court should then continue by factoring the
notion of international comity into its decision whether ultimately to exercise-
or to decline to exercise-jurisdiction. 38
Perhaps because the Supreme Court's avoidance of the extraterritoriality
issue since the 1945 Alcoa decision caused a conspicuous absence of any
guidance from the Supreme Court on the continuing viability of Alcoa and on
the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act, circuit court decisions began in
1976 to call the effects test of Alcoa into question. In Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America,39 the Ninth Circuit reasoned in 1976 that the effects test
established in Alcoa to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction is "by itself
incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests" and because it
does not "take into account the full nature of the relationship between the actors
and this country." 40 The Ninth Circuit therefore proceeded to adopt in
Timberlane a "jurisdictional rule of reason" test for determining the extent of
federal jurisdiction in cases alleging illegal antitrust behavior abroad.41 The
37 See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 ("Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in
Europe, for example, or in South America, may have repercussions in the United States if
there is trade between the two.").
38 Admittedly Justice Souter does not factor international comity out of the jurisdiction
analysis entirely. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct 2891, 2910 (1993).
Justice Souter does not recognize Timberlane in this part of his opinion, however, and
summarily states only that no conflict exists here and that the Court has "no need in this
case to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the
exercise ofjurisdiction on grounds of international comity." Id. at 2911.39 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
("Timberlane I"), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), af'd, 749 F.2d 1378
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Timberlane I"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).4 0 Id. at 611-12.
41 Id. at 613. The lumber company alleged that the Bank of America conspired with
several Honduran companies to prevent Timberlane from milling lumber in Honduras and
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Timberlane test balances seven factors to determine whether a court should
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. The test introduces the notion of comity into
the jurisdictional analysis.42
Although the Supreme Court never expressly approved (or disapproved)
the Tinberlane analysis, the notion of comity remained within the
extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis as the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits
followed the Timberlane analysis to varying degrees. The Third Circuit noted
its "substantial agreement" with Timberlane and then fashioned its own ten-
factor test before remanding the case with instructions for the district court to
apply the balancing test to determine the propriety of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.43 The Fifth Circuit responded to the defendants' request for a
Timberlane analysis by applying the Timberlane factors and concluding, in
part, that the defendants had not demonstrated any "'conflict with [the] law or
policy' of the [foreign government] or any potential difficulty in enforcing a
district court decree." 44 Finally, the Tenth Circuit expressly applied the
Timberlane analysis to conclude that "[c]omity concerns outweigh any effect on
United States commerce" so that "O]urisdiction in the courts of the United
States would be unjustified. "45
exporting it to the United States. The district court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 601.
In Timberlane I, the Ninth Circuit established the jurisdictional rule of reason, vacated
the lower court's denial of jurisdiction, and remanded the case for additional discovery and
further findings in light of the new jurisdictional rule of reason. Id. at 615. On remand, the
district court eventually dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction which the
Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed in Tinberlane I. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, Timberlane 1, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied., 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
42 The court outlined seven factors that should be considered when applying the
effects/comity test: (1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality
of the parties; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state will result in compliance;
(4) the impact within the United States versus the impact elsewhere; (5) the degree of the
intent to affect U.S. commerce; (6) the foreseeability of the effect; and (7) the gravity of the
violation within the United States vis4--vis its gravity elsewhere. Tinberlane I, 549 F.2d at
611-12.
43 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979).
44 Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 885 (5th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Timnberlane I, 549 F.2d at 614), cen. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
45 Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-71 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982). The Tenth Circuit explicitly followed Timberlane's two-part
analysis. Id. at 869 (quoting Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 613).
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Legislative developments subsequent to the Timberlane ruling do not
expressly adopt or even endorse Timberlane's comity analysis. At the very
least, however, Congress has acknowledged that the issue of extraterritorial
antitrust jurisdiction raises concerns regarding international comity. Although
Congress has not altered the language of the Sherman Act since its passage in
1890, Congress did pass the FTAIA, and specifically section 402(1), in 1982 in
part to amend the Sherman Act. 46 Without more, the absence of any express
reference in section 402, which fully defines subject matter jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act, to the notion of comity or to the seven-factor balancing test
established in Timberlane might imply that Congress did not intend to integrate
international comity into the extraterritorial jurisdictional analysis. In addition,
at least one scholar has recognized that the lack of any express reference to the
balancing test "certainly allows a court to decline to employ such analysis, and
indeed may embolden a court to so decline on the theory that Congress does
not consider it important." 47 In fact, however, the legislative history behind the
FTAIA makes clear that Congress took at most a neutral position on the comity
factor and in no way undermined its validity. First, the legislative history
describes the codified jurisdictional statement as a clarification of prior case
law, 48 which includes not only Alcoa but also Timberlane. Second, the
legislative history makes clear that although Congress did not intend for the
comity notion to enter the analysis as part of the first-step determination
regarding subject matter jurisdiction, Congress did intend for the courts to take
international comity into account as part of the second step in the ultimate
extraterritoriality determination. 49
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 (note), 6a, 45(a) (1988). The FTAIA consists of two sections.
Section 402 amends the Sherman Act. As codified in § 402(1) of the FTAIA, the Sherman
Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade with foreign nations, other than import
commerce, "unless... such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect... on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations." Id.
§ 6a.
47 Daniel T. Murphy, Moderating Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised),
54 U. C. L. REv. 779, 813 (1986).
48 H.R. REP. No. 2326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Several scholars believe that the FTAIA represents no significant change from prior
case law. See, e.g., Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The
Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 201 (1983); Murphy, supra note
47 at 806-07.
49 The House Report states that "[i]f a court determines that the requirements for
subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts' ability to
employ notions of comity ...." H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498.
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The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (Restatement) also
advocates a test whose factors include the notion of comity.50 The Restatement
adopted a Timberlane approach in 1987.51 According to the Restatement,
decisionmakers must not only examine national and territorial links52 but also
consider whether exerting jurisdiction is reasonable. 53 The analysis requires a
two-step test, with the notion of comity again entering as part of the second
step. First, a court should determine whether the dispute has a sufficient
nexus-territorial or national-to justify the assertion of jurisdiction.54 If a
sufficient nexus does exist, the court should then continue by asking whether,
on the basis of several factors, an assertion of jurisdiction would be reasonable
in light of general principles of international fairness and competing national
interests. 55 Finally, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in its Hartford opinion,
scholars also advocate an approach that includes comity.56
At least two circuits have declined to adopt the Timberlane analysis. The
Seventh Circuit refused to read Timberlane as undermining the continuing
viability of the Alcoa effects test as the standard of extraterritorial jurisdiction
of the Sherman Act. 57 The D.C. Circuit expressly stated that the imberlane
analysis was "not useful in resolving the controversy" before summarizing the
potential problems with a balancing approach. 58 Justice Scalia's dissent in
Hartford however, recasts the Timberlane approach in such a way as to
eliminate effectively the D.C. Circuit's stated concerns. As Justice Scalia
makes clear "the practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial
reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence, 59 and an approach
that considers comity is rooted in these jurisprudential principles so that the
approach is in no way a balancing of subjective factors. Justice Scalia
Professor and scholar Barry Hawk suggests that § 402 does not intend to reject the
balancing test established in Timberlane. See BARRY E. HAWK, UNTED STATES, COMMON
MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTrrRusT: A COMPARATIvE GUIDE 22-23 (Supp. 1982).50 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-03 (1987).
51 See id.
52 See id. § 402.
53 See id. § 403.
54 See id. § 402(1)-(2).
55 See id. § 403(2).
56 In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991), aft'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
57 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
58 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
59 Id. at 2920 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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summarizes the relevant principles ° by resurrecting two principles of statutory
construction relevant to a determination whether Congress intended to assert
regulatory power extraterritorially over the challenged conduct: first, "the
'long-standing principle of American law "that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States;"'" 61 and, second, the principle that "'[ain act of congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.'"62
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Souter defined "true conflict" for the majority in Hartford so
narrowly as to effectively eliminate the international comity consideration from
the extraterritoriality analysis. U.S. jurisprudence and especially developments
over the last twenty years that replace the one-step Alcoa approach with a two-
step analysis that integrates comity considerations suggest that the majority's
ruling on this issue is misplaced. An additional argument exists as to why U.S.
courts should not assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least under the facts in
Hartford. Congress enacted the Sherman Act as protection for U.S. consumers.
In this instance, however, hailing the British reinsurers into U.S. courts can
60 Justice Scalia severed the extraterritoriality issue into two parts: whether the district
court had jurisdiction; and, second, whether the Sherman Act reached the extraterritorial
conduct alleged by the states. Justice Scalia conceded that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the Sherman Act claims against all the defendants, including the
British reinsurers. According to Justice Scalia, the states asserted nonfrivolous claims under
the Sherman Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 vests district courts with subject matter jurisdiction
over cases "arising under" federal statutes. Justice Scalia recognized, however, that "[t]he
second question-the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act-has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the courts" but rather "turn[s] on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act,
Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct." Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at
2918.
61 Id. at 2918 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)). Justice
Scalia implies that absent precedent including Alcoa, he would have applied this first
principle to Sherman Act "boilerplate language" construed in other contexts not to outweigh
the presumption against extraterritoriality to find that Congress did not intend extraterritorial
application. See id. at 2918-22. Justice Scalia nowhere suggests that he would overturn
Alcoa. His analytical framework however, at least in this case, makes express reversal
unnecessary. Justice Scalia can rely on the second principle to reach an outcome that instead
supplements the effects test with basic principles of statutory construction. See infra note 62
and accompanying text.
62 Id. at 2919 (quoting Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 118 (1804)).
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provide no protection to U.S. consumers that is not already provided by way of
the Supreme Court's two initial rulings on the boycott issue. Because the
British reinsurers have a presence in the U.S. insurance market only through
their dealings with U.S. domestic insurers, the Supreme Court necessarily
restricts the conduct of the British reinsurers by restricting the conduct of the
domestic insurers. The Supreme Court majority's decision to reverse inroads
made in U.S. jurisprudence toward re-establishing international comity as a
central consideration in the jurisdictional analysis thus severely harms U.S.
diplomatic relationships-and harms them unnecessarily: the exercise of
jurisdiction over the British reinsurers accrues no independent benefits for U.S.
consumers.
